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INTRODUCTION

The United Mine Workers of America 1950 and 1974 Benefit
Plans (UMWA Plans)' provide health benefits to 124,191 retired and
disabled coal miners, surviving spouses and dependents. 2 Beginning
in 1988 the Plans began to encounter funding short-falls. This has
required mid-term increases in the contribution rate specified in the
1988 National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement (1988 Agreement)
and, ultimately, resulted in litigation between the Plan Trustees and
the Bituminous Coal Operators' Association (BCOA).3 During 1990
the Plans were the subject of a six-month study by an Advisory
Commission appointed by Secretary of Labor Elizabeth Dole. 4 The
Commission was a source of controversy5 and did not reach a con1. The UMWA Plans are collectively bargained Taft-Hartley trusts established under the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement (NBCWA). The NBCWA is the predominate labor contract
in the unionized sector of the coal industry. It is negotiated between the United Mine Workers of
America (UMWA) and the Bituminous Coal Operators' Association (BCOA). The BCOA is an association which represents member companies in multi-employer bargaining with the UMWA. BCOA
member companies account for approximately half of all UMWA-represented coal production. The
overwhelming majority of non-BCOA members also sign the NBCWA and, therefore, also participate
in the UMWA Benefit Plans.
2. As of June 30, 1990, the 1950 Plan had 110,667 beneficiaries, the 1974 Plan had 13,524.
UMWA HEALTH & R
amnmoTi
FUNDS, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1990).
3. See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
4. Advisory Commission on United Mine Workers of America Retiree Health Benefits ("Dole
Commission"). See infra notes 52-66 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Comments of Commission Chairman W.J. Usery, Jr., stating that "[o]f all the
things I've been ... involved with, I can't remember when we have stirred up as much controversy
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/5
within an industry." Advisory Group's Work Was Task Fraught With Controversy Usery Says, Daily2
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sensus on the crucial question of who should pay for the UMWA
retiree health benefits. Nevertheless, a likely outgrowth of the Commission's activities is that the UMWA and the BCOA will seek legislative action to broaden the Plans' contribution base. 6
Some of the legislative solutions suggested for resolving the
UMWA retiree health care quandary have constitutional implications. 7 In order to assess the constitutional dimensions it is necessary
to trace the evolution of the UMWA Benefit Plans, assess their
current situation, and examine the key details of the suggested legislative solutions. It may be of assistance, however, to first place

the retiree health care issue in a broader perspective.
II.

THE

NATIONAL PERSPECTIvE

Prior to the mid-1960's few employers provided health benefits
to their retirees. 8 Such coverage has now become commonplace. In
1988 employers provided health benefits to about 7 million retirees
and their dependents at an annual cost of about $9 billion. 9 One
recent study reported that almost 80% of large and mid-sized com-

panies offer such benefits to retirees under 65, and almost 70%
extend coverage to Medicare-eligible retirees.10 There are many posLabor Report (BNA) No. 230, at A-11 (November 29, 1990). A group of over one hundred fifty
non-UMWA coal companies challenged, among other things, the make-up of the Commission and
whether the UMWA Benefit Plans actually face a funding crisis. See The Private Benefits Alliance,
Presentation of the Private Benefits Alliance to the Advisory Commission on United Mine Workers
of America Retiree Health Care (October 10, 1990).
6. Quenon PromisesFurtherAction on 'Orphans', 14 Coal Outlook (Pasha Publications, Inc.)
I (Nov. 12, 1990):
If the secretary of labor [sic] refuses to act on an industry-wide tax to help save the 1950
and 1974 UMW pension funds [sic], signatories to those Funds will go for a Capitol Hill
showdown on the issue.
That's the promise of Robert Quenon, Chairman of Peabody Holding and a member of
the commission appointed by Labor Secretary Elizabeth Dole to examine the health of the
Funds.
7. See infra text at pages 649-70.
8. EDUCATION AND PUBLIC WELFARE DivisIoN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, PUB. No.
IB88004, HEALTH BmEsS FOR RETIRES: AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE 2 (1990).
9. U.S. GmNA. ACCOUNTmINo OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/HRD-89-51, EmsLOYim BmFTS, CoMPAN Es' RETIE HEALTH LIABImrrms LARGE, ADVANCE FUNDING COSTLY 1 (1989) [hereinafter GOA
REPORT].

10. A. Foster Higgins & Co., Inc., Health Care Benefits Survey 1989, Report 4: Retiree Health
Care 5 (1990); see also Chollet, Retiree Health Insurance Benefits: Trends and Issues, in RETIREE
HEALTH BENEFITs:
WHAT
Is THE Repository
PRomISE? 20@(Employee
Benefits Research Institute, 1989).
Disseminated
by The
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WVU, 1991
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sible explanations for this trend but the introduction of Medicare
is likely the primary catalyst. Except for retirees under the age of
65, employer coverage is supplemental to Medicare and has constituted a relatively small cost component of an employer's total
benefit package."'
In 1988, a report by the Government Accounting Office (GAO)
put the cost of providing postretirement health benefits in a very
different perspective. The GAO study concluded:
The nation's private employers have accumulated significant obligations to their
current and retired employees for retiree health benefits. We estimate $227 billion
or about one-fourteenth of the value of all companies' stocks in 1988 is owed.
In addition, companies can anticipate $175 billion in future accruals for their
active workers, for a total retiree health benefit liability of $402 billion. 2

The GAO announcement had the impact of a tornado sighting
on a calm summer day. Most employers had never even attempted
to calculate what the ultimate economic burden of providing lifetime
retiree health benefits might be. If the GAO report was a shot across
the bow, the Financial Accounting Standards Board's (FASB) February 14, 1989, draft accounting standard 13 was a direct hit. This
draft provides that employers who offer post-retirement health benefits must treat them as deferred compensation and reflect their present value on the corporate balance sheet. Although the final FASB
standard is not expected to become effective before 1993, the reality
that all companies will soon have to reflect the long term cost of
retiree health benefit promises on their bottom line has sparked
widespread awareness and debate about the issue.
11. Despite the frequency of this benefit, the GAO has estimated that only forty percent of
all private sector workers work for employers that offer post-retirement health benefits. U.S. GENERAL
AccotNTmG OFFICE, Ptm. No. GOA/HRD-90-92, EMPLOYEE BEmTrrs: EXTENT OF COMPANmS' RETIREE HEALTH COVERAGoE 1 (1990).
12. GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 3. Although these numbers are mind numbing, they pale
in comparison to estimates of the total retiree health care bill. One commentator has estimated the
present value of the cost of providing post age sixty-five health care to everyone who is now forty
years of age or older at $6.7 trillion dollars. Enthoven, Retiree Health Benefits as a Public Policy

Issue, in RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS: WHAT ISTHE PROMISE? 3-4, 7 (Employee Benefits Research
Institute, 1989).
13. Relevant sections of this FASB draft have been reprinted in RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS:
WHAT IS THE PROMISE? 147-207 app. (Employee Benefits Research Institute, 1989). Employers will
not be required to recognize future obligations to a multi-employer plan under this standard. Id. at
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/5
4
183-84.
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The rapidly changing financial implications associated with providing retiree health care virtually insures that many companies will
seek to alter benefits for future retirees, and possibly curtail benefits
to current retirees as well. In the view of one commentator,
[I]t seems unlikely that future retirees will enjoy the kind of health benefits that
we see among today's retirees. Confronting huge financial liabilities for retiree
benefits, many employers are likely either to terminate their health plans or substantially alter the benefit promise to reduce projected corporate cost. The budget
and philosophical constraints on legislation that would assist employers in funding
benefit obligations suggest that the legislative debate will be a long one, and that
the ultimate legislation may be less favorable to employers than comparable pen1
sion legislation has been. 4

It is, of course, far more difficult to reduce or discontinue a
benefit than to introduce it in the first instance. An employer's right

to curtail benefits for current retirees or for active employees who
have already satisfied the employer's eligibility requirements has been

the subject of much litigation.15 Moreover, even in situations where
an employer has clearly reserved an adequate legal basis for curtailing or discontinuing such behefits, it can be expected that retirees,
16
current employees and labor unions will resist changes.

It is against this backdrop that issues involving the continued
funding of benefits for retirees who receive health care from the

UMWA Plans must be examined. Although unique in certain respects, the situation facing the UMWA Plans can be viewed as a

microcosm of the broader retiree health care dilemma. With respect
to the national situation, one observer has framed the issue as follows:
Someone has to pay and no one wants to. Pressures are building. Spiraling health
care costs are driving all health care issues today, and we must deal with this
17
factor sooner or later.

14. Chollet, supra note 10, at 36.
15. There is no statutory entitlement to or regulation of postretirement health care. Most courts
have relied on a contract analysis to adjudicate disputes, focusing principally on the intent of the
parties with respect to questions of entitlement, amount and duration. Schmidt, Retiree Health Benefits: An Illusory Promise?, in RETIRE HEALH BENFrrs: WHAT IS THE PROMISE? 53-64 (Employee
Benefits Research Institute, 1989).
16. Indeed, the cost of health care has become the main issue in 87% of all labor disputes.
THE SE RETARY OF LABOR'S ADvIsORY COMMISSION ON UNITED MInE WORKERS OF AMERICA RETIREE
HEALTH BENEITS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COAL COMIsSION REPORT (1990) [hereinafter REPORT].
17. Kahn, A CongressionalPerspective, in RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS: WHAT IS Tm PROMISE?
Disseminated
by The
Research
Repository
@ WVU, 1991
125 (Employee
Benefits
Research
Institute, 1989).
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I Due to a confluence of events, it seems likely that Congress will

be called upon to examine the retiree health benefits issue in the
coal industry sooner rather than later.
III.

THE UMWA RETmEE HE LTH PLANS

Commenting on how the high cost of collectively bargained retiree health benefits could have been ignored for so long, one cornmenter has observed, "[r]etiree health benefits were a bargaining
prize that apparently could be won or granted with no present sacrifice in wages or profits. Now the long-run consequences are becoming apparent."' 8 In order to evaluate the proposals that have
been put forth to pay this "bargaining prize" in the coal industry,
it is necessary to understand how the entitlement of UMWA members to post-retirement health benefits arose.
Although there are many multi-employer health plans 9 it is
doubtful that any can compare to the UMWA Plans for their richness of history and their role in dominating labor relations in an
industry. The UMWA Benefit Plans trace their lineage to the first
collectively bargained multi-employer welfare plan, which was created in 1946 at a time when the mines were under the control of
the federal government.

A. Creation of the UMWA Welfare and Retirement Fund: 19401950
Prior to the 1940's, there was no provision in UMWA collective
bargaining agreements concerning the provision of pension or medical benefits. In the period 1940 through 1950 UMWA President
John L. Lewis set as goals for negotiations obtaining health and

18. Enthoven, supra note 12, at 12-13.
19. There are over 915 multi-employer health plans, 66% of which provide some level of benefits
to retirees. Six percent of all retirees eligible for employer-sponsored health benefits receive them from
multi-employer plans. U.S. GHNEw. Accouvrno OimcE, PuB. No. GAO/HRD-90-132, Em.L'ov
BENErns, Exmir op Muv -EmoLo'R PLAN RnmEE HmATH Covnp.cob 1 (1990).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/5
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pension benefits for his members and gaining control over their delivery.20
In negotiations for a successor to the 1945 Agreement, creation
of a health and retirement fund was the cornerstone of the Union's
contract demands. Indeed, Lewis refused to talk of other provisions
until the operators agreed "in principle" to a health and retirement
fund. When the operators refused, a strike ensued. 2 The impact of
the miners strike had its intended effect, and the government sought
to mediate. 22 On May 10, 1946, a White House source announced
that the operators had agreed "in principle" to a health and welfare
fund, but the operators apparently reneged and the negotiations collapsed. 23 On May 21, 1946, President Truman ordered Secretary of
the Interior Julius A. Krug to seize the mines under the War Labor
Disputes Act and to negotiate an agreement with the UMWA for
the one year period covered by government operations of the mines. 4
On May 29, 1946, Secretary Krug and Lewis executed the National Coal Wage Agreement (Krug-Lewis Agreement) which addressed, at least temporarily, the Union's demand for a welfare fund.
Actually, the Krug-Lewis Agreement established two separate funds.
The first was a "Welfare and Retirement Fund" to be managed by
three trustees, one appointed by Krug, one by the President of the
UMWA, and the third by the other two trustees. This fund was to
be financed by contributions of 5 cents per ton and was to be used
primarily to compensate miners, their dependents and their survivors
for lost wages resulting from temporary or permanent disability,

20. In 1941 negotiations for the Appalachian Joint Wage Agreement, Lewis proposed to give
the UMWVA the right to participate in selecting physicians and supervising medical services financed

through deductions. M. DuaorFsy & W. VAN Tnw, Join L. LEwis: A BioGRAPHw 459 (1947). The
employers rejected that proposal. Id. Lewis next raised this issue in negotiations for the 1945 Agreement. Id. The employers rejected Lewis' proposal for imposition of a 10 cent per ton royalty to create
a welfare trust. Id. at 455. In the compromise that led to the 1945 Agreement, Lewis backed away
from his welfare program demand. Id.
21. Id. at 459.

22. During the 1940's coal was the lifeblood of the country's industrial base and a strike impacted on the economy quickly. It was indispensable for steel making, generation of electric power,
rail transportation, home heating, and other fundamental economic activity.
23. M. DutoFsny & W. VAN TiN, supra note 20, at 461.
24. Id.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991
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death or retirement.21 The second fund was a "Medical and Hospital
Fund" to be administered entirely by trustees appointed by the

UMWA and financed by wage deductions authorized by employees.
The trustees were "to provide, or to arrange for the availability of,
medical, hospital, and related services for the miners and their dependents."26
On April 29, 1947, Lewis and the operators began negotiations

in anticipation of the June 30, 1947, return of the mines to the
owners. These negotiations resulted in the National Bituminous Coal
Wage Agreement of 1947 (1947 Agreement), which merged the two

Krug-Lewis funds into a single trust known as the "United Mine
Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund," and increased
the contribution rate to 10 cents per ton.2 7 As with many new ideas,
implementation of the benefit programs laid out in the 1947 Agreement did not proceed smoothly. 28 Strikes and labor unrest over the
implementation of the Fund continued intermittently until 1950.
The 1950 negotiations marked the end of the or turmoil occasioned by the difficult birth of Lewis' vision. In return for concessions in other areas, the signatory operators agreed to establish
a trust to be known as the "United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund of 1950" (1950 Fund). Most importantly,
25. National Bituminous Wage Agreement, May 29, 1946, United States - United Mine Workers of America, para. 46) (the wage agreements cited herein are available upon request from the West
Virginia Law Review).
26. Id. at para. 4(b).
27. National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1947, Various Coal Operators and Associations - United Mine Workers of America, Welfare and Retirement Fund, para. A [hereinafter
1947 Agreement]. The 1947 Agreement specified that the new fund would accept any unexpended or
unobligated monies remaining in the two Krug-Lewis trusts. Id. at B(3).
28. The trustees were unable to work out any kind of program because the operators' trustee
was uncooperative. FINLEY, Tim CoRRUPT KiNoDOM: THE RISE AND FALI OF Tim UTraD MINE WoRKEns 780 (1912). Lewis met the lack of progress with a strike commencing in mid-March, 1948. Id.
at 182. Joseph W. Martin, Speaker of the House of Representatives, hoping to parlay a successful
mediation of the coal strike into a nomination for the U.S. Presidency, arranged for Senator Styles
Bridges to be named as the neutral trustee. Id. at 182-83. Bridges and Lewis adopted a pension program
opposed by the operators. Id. at 183. The operators' trustee sued to set aside that program, but the
court affirmed its legality. Id. at 184. These developments led the operators to agree to a new contract
in 1948 which continued the fund. EDUCATION AND PUBLIC WEFARE DsviSoN, CONORESSIONAL RESEARCH SERViCE, HISTORY OF THE UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AERICA WELFARE AND RETIREmENT

FUND 9 (1980). However, the fund was forced to curtail pension benefits in September 1948 because

of lack of money. See generally DunoFsicy & VAN TnE, supra note 20.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/5
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the operators committed to cooperate with the Union in its administration. 29 The Agreement also specified that Lewis' faithful friend

Josephine Roche would be the neutral Trustee, effectively yielding
control of the 1950 Fund to the Union.3 0 Although the structure and

stated purpose of the 1950 Fund differed little from the trust established by the 1947 Agreement, it was the operators good faith
commitment to cease their obstreperous tactics in 1950 that enabled
the 1950 Fund to begin functioning as envisioned by Lewis.
B.

Union Domination: 1950-1974

The 1950's began with an employer-funded welfare program secure at last and under the firm control of the Union. The Fund was
the exclusive source of health, pension and other welfare benefits
for all UMWA miners and retirees and their dependents. As a practical matter the trustees were the sole arbiters of benefits, eligibility
criteria, and all other matters affecting the health and welfare of
31
UMWA members.
The administrative structure of the 1950 Fund changed little from
1950 through 1974. A signatory's obligation through this period was
to pay the tonnage rate specified in the contract, and the Fund
operated on a pay-as-you-go basis. Eligibility criteria and benefit
levels fluctuated depending on the economic condition of the in-

29. The 1950 Agreement provided:
It is the intent and purpose of the contracting parties hereto that full cooperation shall by
each of them be given to each other, the Trustees named under this Section and to all
affected Mine Workers to the eventual coordination and development of policies and working agreements necessary or adisable for the effective operation of this Fund.
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950, Various Coal Operators and Associations United Mine Workers of America, Welfare and Retirement Fund of 1950, para. D [hereinafter 1950
Agreement]. It also provided that the 1950 Fund would succeed to the unencumbered assets of the
1947 trust. Id. at B(3).
30. Duiaorsiy & VAN Tnm, supra note 20, at 489.
31. Fn;LEY, supra note 28, at 189:
The three trustees of the Fund had enormous authority. While the labor contract with the
industry created the supply of money, it provided only a broad statement of purpose. The
trustees had the power to say who got the money, how it was to be spent, how it was to
be invested, what benefits were to be paid. They would meet and make their own rules.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991
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dustry. 32 Benefits were adjusted to comport with available funds and,
3
on occasion, entire categories of beneficiaries lost their eligibility.
The era of the 1950 Fund ended on a tragic note. The UMWA's
largely unsupervised domination of the Fund led to abuses and,
ultimately to beneficiary-initiated legal actions. Ensuing court orders
resulted in major changes in the way the 1950 Fund conducted its
34
business.
C.

Restructuring in Collective Bargaining: 1974-1978

The 1974 bargaining began shortly after the court ordered reforms to the 1950 Fund. It also occurred at a time of great promise
for the coal industry and signatory operators agreed to the most
generous labor contract ever. With respect to pension and health
benefits the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1974
(1974 Agreement) provided for:
substantially increased benefits under both the 1950 and 1974 Pension Plans, and
liberalized eligibility requirements for health benefits as well as for pensions. The
contracts also introduced several entirely new benefits for the industry ... [including] lifetime health benefits for disabled mine workers, mine workers' surviving spouses, and disabled or mentally retarded children. 3

In response to the newly enacted Employee Retirement Income
and Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)36 which required that pension
plans be fully funded on an actuarial basis, it was necessary to
separate pensions from the other benefits provided by the 1950 Fund.
The 1974 Agreement therefore established four separate trusts: The
32. From the outset Lewis chose to maximize current wages at the expense of building a sound
financial basis for the Fund. [H]e insisted on a liberal benefit program and expected to wrest from
the operators the money needed to cover the costs through his collective bargaining skills. As a result
of these decisions, the welfare and retirement fund was a noble venture fated for financial troubles."
DtmoF-sy & VAN TMn, supra note 20, at 510-511.
33. In 1954, for example, benefits to some 30,000 disabled miners and 24,000 widows and
children were stopped. FINLEY, supra note 28, at 190.
34. Lamb v. Carey, 498 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 689 (1974); Boyle v.
Blankenship, 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd 511 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Blankenship
v. UMWA Welfare and Retirement Fund of 1950, 82 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3071; See also FINLEY, supra
note 28, at 198-202.
35. United Mine Workers of America Health and Retirement Funds, Employee Handbook,
reprinted in Education and Public Welfare Division, supra note 28 at 14.
36. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/5
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1950 Pension Trust and 1950 Benefit Trust to provide pension and
health benefits to mine workers retiring prior to January 1, 1976,
and the 1974 Pension Trust and 1974 Benefit Trust to provide pension and health benefits for active miners and those retiring after
January 1, 1976. 37 Significantly, the 1974 Agreement specified that
1950 and 1974 Plan retirees, surviving spouses and certain depend38
ents would receive a health card for life.
The 1974 Agreement was a watershed event with respect to pension and health benefits for UMWA miners and retirees. First, the
signatories agreed to create significant new benefits and increase
existing ones, at a substantial cost.3 9 Second, the UMWA and the
BCOA assumed responsibility for establishing eligibility criteria and
benefit levels in collective bargaining, and the trustees ceased to have
unilateral authority to make decisions concerning the Plans. Third,
the settlors reduced the results of their collective bargaining into
written plan documents which governed the trustees' administration
of the Plans during the term of the Agreement.
The restructuring of the 1950 Fund as a result of 1974 bargaining
did not affect the comprehensive nature of the pension and benefit
program for UMWA members. Indeed, as a consequence of the
optimistic economic forecasts, the parties' efforts to correct abuses
of the past, and the need to satisfy ERISA's pension funding requirements, UMWA miners and retirees emerged with more generous
and better secured benefits than ever. Pay-as-you-go pensions were
a thing of the past, and setting forth benefit levels and eligibility
criteria in written plan documents enabled the settlors to project
needed contribution rates for the term of the contract, thereby stabilizing the delivery of benefits.
Negotiations in 1978 brought the final restructuring. Signatory
operators demanded and, after a 111 day strike, achieved the contractual right to provide health benefits to both their active miners
37. See 1974 Agreement, Article XX §§ (a)-(c) and Summary of Principal Provisions (1)-(I).
38. Id. at 99-106.
39. Signatories contributed 80 cents per ton to the 1950 Fund immediately prior to the effective
date of the 1974 Agreement. Total contributions to the four new trusts started at 74 cents per ton

and 98 cents per hour worked.
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and their retirees directly rather than through the 1974 Benefit Plan.
Retirees covered by the 1950 Benefit Plan were not affected by this
change. The dismantling of the 1974 Benefit Plan was, perhaps, the
most important change in the system for providing health care to
UMWA members since the creation of the 1950 Fund.
As part of the compromise which resulted in this historic change,
the 1978 Agreement also provided that (i) the 1974 Benefit Plan
would continue for the limited purpose of providing health benefits
to UMWA retirees whose last employer ceased business 40 and (ii)
signatory employers would guarantee all health and pension benefits
41
during the term of the contract.
D.

Recent History. 1978-1990

The basic structure of the UMWA Pension and Benefit Plans
has remained unchanged. since 1978. A judicial declaration that the
1974 Benefit Plan must assume benefit coverage whenever an employer ceased to be contractually obligated to do so has led to the
rapid increase in the number of beneficiaries in the 1974 Plan. 2
Total contributions to the four UMWA Plans decreased by approximately 50 07 43 under the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1988 (1988 Agreement), largely because the 1950 Pension
Plan became fully funded during 1987. The 1988 Agreement also
changed the contribution method from a system weighted towards
tons produced to one based exclusively on hours worked.

40. 1978 Agreement, Article XX(c)(3)(iii). Several court decisions have affirmed that the 1974
Plan is also obligated to provide health benefits to retirees whose last employer ceases to be signatory
to a UMWA Wage Agreement. See United Mine Workers of Am. Int'l Union v. Nobel, 720 F. Supp.
1169 (W.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd, 902 F.2d 1558 (3d Cir.), cert. denied II1 S. Ct. 383 (1990); cf. District
29, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Royal Coal Co., 768 F.2d 588 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding coal
company not responsible for retiree health benefits following expiration of coal wage agreement),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 935 (1988).
41. 1978 Agreement, Article XX(h), quoted infra note 48. This guarantee appears in the Agreements of 1981, 1984, and 1988 as well.
42. Cf. Nobel, 720 F. Supp. at 1171 (requiring health plan to provide benefits where employer
is no longer a signatory to wage agreement). The trial court's opinion in the Nobel case contains an
extensive history of the bargaining pertaining to the UMWA Plans covering the period 1974-1988.
Id. at 1173.
43. Compare Article XX(d) of the NBCWA of 1984 with Article XX(d) of the 1988 Agreement.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/5
12

Woodrum and Rothman: Proposals for Funding United Mine Workers of America Retiree Heal

1991]

FUNDING UMWA HEALTH BENEFITS

Thus, at this time, the 1988 Agreement provides that any miner
who retired prior to 1976 and receives a pension from the UMWA

1950 Pension Plan will receive health benefits from the 1950 Benefit
Plan. 44 Any retiree who receives a pension from the UMWA 1974

Pension Plan is eligible for employer-provided health benefits so
long as his employer is signatory to a UMWA contract which provided for such coverage. All other 1974 Plan pensioners receive health
benefits from the 1974 Benefit Plan. 45
IV.
A.

TnE

EmRGING PROBLEM

Background
The 1988 Agreement became effective February 1, 1988. It soon

became apparent that the contract rate specified for the 1950 Benefit
Plan was not sufficient to cover the Plan's actual costs. 46 Effective
July 1, 1988, the BCOA increased the rate for all signatories from
$1.83 per hour to $2.00 per hour and, effective May 1, 1989, to
$2.17 per hour. Subsequently, the Trustees informed BCOA that the

$2.17 rate was not enough to prevent the Plan from accruing a
deficit. The BCOA refused to authorize additional increases and,
on July 19, 1989, the Trustees filed suit 47 seeking to compel the

44. 1988 Agreement, Article XX, at 158. The 1950 Plan also covers certain disabled miners,
surviving spouses and eligible dependents. Retirees must have at least 20 years of credited service to
qualify for health care benefits. Id. at 160.
45. The 1974 Plan also covers certain disabled miners, surviving spouses and eligible dependents.
A deferred vested pensioner with less than 20 years of service is ineligible for health benefits. Id. at
160. It should be noted that there is still a dispute with respect to whether the 1974 Plan is obligated
to provide benefits to certain categories of pensioners. See, e.g., Nobel, 720 F. Supp. at 1169.
46. Apparently, the BCOA was aware that the initial rates set in the 1988 Agreement would
not be adequate. See Nobel, 720 F. Supp. at 1177-78:
[In 1988 bargaining] [t]he Union negotiators had projected that contributions in the range
of 18 to 22 cents per hour would be necessary to provide benefits to the potential beneficiaries and maintain the corpus of the trust at the end of the contract. They expressed
skepticism that eight cents would be sufficient to provide benefits to the potential beneficiaries over the term of the agreement. The BCOA responded that, since they were guaranteeing the benefits, the UMWA should not be concerned about the contribution rate,
and that additional money would be forthcoming if necessary.
47. Connors v. BCOA, No. 89-1744 (D.D.C. filed). This case is still pending. On August 14,
1990 Judge Jackson entered a preliminary injunction which resulted in the BCOA setting a $2.92 per
hour rate for the period September 1 through December 31, 1990. Id. The parties entered into agreed
orders covering
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BCOA to honor the guarantee clause at Article XX(h) of the 1988
Agreement.

48

The 1988 Agreement set the contribution rate to the 1974 Benefit
Plan at eight cents per hour. This rate also proved to be inadequate,
and the 1974 Plan developed funding deficiencies. On March 23,
1990, the Trustees again filed suit 49 against the BCOA seeking to
enforce the guarantee clause with respect to the 1974 Plan.
A separate event during this period also focused attention on the
Benefit Plans. When the 1984 Agreement expired, the Pittston Coal
Group, Inc. (Pittston) a substantial coal industry employer and longtime participant in the UMWA Plans refused to sign the 1988 Agreement negotiated between the UMWA and the BCOA. Instead, Pittston terminated its labor agreement, ceased making contributions to
the UMWA Pension and Benefit Plans, and notified its retirees that
it would no longer provide them with health benefits. In lieu of
continued participation in the UMWA Plans, Pittston proposed a
single employer pension plan and a health plan for its employees
and pensioners with deductibles and other cost containment features
not provided for under the 1988 UMWA-BCOA Agreement. °

48. Article XX(h) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provisions in this Agreement the Employers hereby agree to fully
guarantee the pension and health benefits provided by the 1950 Pension Fund, the 1950
Benefit Fund, the 1974 Pension Fund, the 1974 Benefit Fund and all other benefit plans
described in Section (c) of this Article XX during the term of this Agreement.
In order to fully fund these guaranteed benefits, the BCOA may increase, not decrease the
rate of contributions to be made to the 1950 Pension Fund, the 1950 Benefit Fund, the
1974 Pension Fund, the 1974 Benefit Fund and all other benefit plans described in Section
(c) of this Article XX during the term of this Agreement. These contributions, which may
be adjusted from time to time, shall be made by all Employers signatory hereto during the
term of this Agreement.
49. Connors v. BCOA, No. 90-0674 (D.D.C. filed). This case is still pending. On June 29,
1990, Judge Gesell entered a preliminary injunction which resulted in the BCOA setting a 33 cents
per hour rate for the period August 1 through November 30, 1990. Id. The parties entered into agreed
orders covering subseqnent months.
50. Pittston was adamant that, among other things, the cost and potential future liabilities of
continued participation in the UMWA Plans were prohibitive. The Union was equally adamant that
a major employer's withdrawal might cause other signatories to seek to terminate their participation.
The UMWA Plans are governed by legal trust documents negotiated between the UMWA and the
BCOA in national bargaining, which cannot be altered except with the joint agreement of the settlors.
Thus, it was difficult, if not impossible, for the Union to respond to specific issues raised by Pittston
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/5
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B. The Advisory Commission on UMWA Retiree Health
Benefits
The Pittston dispute lasted 24 months and was eventually settled
with the assistance of a high level mediator 5 ' appointed by U.S.
Secretary of Labor Elizabeth Dole. However, the fact the strike had
been greatly prolonged by difficulties encountered in bargaining about
the UMWA Plans led Secretary Dole to form an Advisory Commission "to make recommendations to the Secretary of Labor on
health care issues arising from [the] 1950 and 1974 UMWA Benefit
Plans and the effects of resolving these issues on the coal industry
as a whole." 52 This Commission was charged with advising the Secretary concerning (i) the financial status and prospects of the UMWA
Benefit Plans, (ii) the means of delivery of health benefits to UMWA
retirees and their dependents and (iii) arrangements for assuring the
53
long-term financial viability of the UMWA Benefit Plans.
The Commission estimated the combined deficit of both Plans
is estimated to be $114.7 million as of October, 1990. 54 The Report
noted that more than half of the Plans' beneficiaries last worked
for companies which had either gone out of business or ceased to
be signatory to a UMWA labor agreement requiring them to participate in the Plans. The Commission concluded that "[h]ow to
continue to provide health benefits to 'orphans' is the essence of
55
the problem."

51. W. J. Usery, Jr., a former Secretary of Labor. Mr. Usery was subsequently appointed as
Chairman of the Commission Secretary Dole established to study UMWA retiree benefits.
52. REPORT, supra note 16, at 147, "The payment of health care benefits to retired and disabled
miners and their families was a major issue in the [Pittston] strike and was responsible in large measure
for the subsequent formation of this Commission." Id. at 4.
53. Id. at 6, 145.
54. Id. at 4. UMWA Funds Executive Director, Jerry Clark estimated the combined deficits
to be in excess of $90 million as of December 31, 1990. See March 29, 1991, Declaration of Jerry
N. Clark, para. 5, submitted as an affadavit in the case of United Mine Workers of America 1974
Pension Trust, et al. v. The Pittston Company, et al., No. 88-0969 (D.D.C. 1991). Although the
Commission projected a deficit of more than $300 million by 1993, Report at 4, it apparently did
not factor in the effect of the court ordered incidents. This projection also ignores the "guarantee
clause" litigation discussed above. See supra notes 48 & 50 and accompanying text. Assuming the
courts enforce the guarantee clause, it would be incumbent on current signatories to insure that the
Plans have no deficit at the time the current Agreement expires.
55. Id. at iv (Executive Summary).
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C. Some Proposalsfor a Solution
The Commissioners reached a consensus with respect to a number
of points56 but not with respect to the question of who should be
asked to pay for the health care of a Plan beneficiary whose last
employer no longer contributes. Three choices appear possible (1)
all coal industry employers should pay irrespective of whether they
were ever signatory to a UMWA labor agreement, (2) current signatories plus any employer who was previously signatory should
pay,5 7 or (3) current signatories should continue to pay in accordance
58
with historical precedent and present contract obligations.
Although the Commission did not make recommendations with
respect to who should pay for "orphan" retirees health benefits in
the future, the Report referred two funding proposals to the Secretary of Labor for consideration.5 9 The two proposals are similar
in certain respectsA0
56. These include: (i) retired miners are entitled to the health care benefits that were promised
and guaranteed them; (ii) a statutory obligation to contribute should be imposed on employers currently
participating in the Plan and employers who formerly participated but do not now do so; (iii) mechanisms should be enacted to prevent employers from "dumping" retiree health care obligations on
the Plans; (iv) legislation should be enacted which would permit the transfer of assets from the
overfunded 1950 Pension Plan to the Benefit Plans; and (v) implement managed care and cost containment activities designed to reduce costs without loss of benefits. Id. at 81-105.
57. Id. at 84 ("Many Commissioners believe that the orphans represent an industry-wide problem that should be resolved on an industry-wide basis. Others believe that only current and past
signatories should be required to finance orphan health care.").
58. This is the position advocated by most coal industry employers who have never been signatory to a UMWA labor agreement, as well as current or former signatories who have withdrawn
from the Plans. These companies argue that the Plans were created in collective bargaining, that there
is no financial crisis, and that any problems which the Plans may face can be resolved in collective
bargaining between the UMWA and the BCOA. See supra note 5. See also Letter from Scott Kiscaden
for the Private Benefits Alliance to Roderick A. DeArment, Acting Secretary of Labor 7 (November
30, 1990) ("By failing to acknowledge that the parties intended to create, fund and perpetuate Plans
which would provide benefits for all UMWA members, including orphans .... the Report invites
a sympathetic response to suggestions that the bargaining parties should now be relieved from their
contractual promises - even if this means forcing non-signatories to pay.").
59. "Because of the lack of consensus on the question of who should pay for orphans, the
Commission has reviewed an industry-wide funding proposal and an alternative funding proposal.
The Commission believes that both proposals, modified as may be appropriate, should be considered,
along with any other funding arrangements that may be developed, to resolve the crisis in retiree
health care in the coal industry." REPoRT, supra note 16, at 84.
60. The "industry-wide" plan was proposed by Commissioners Richard L. Trumka, President
of the UMWA and Robert H. Quenon, Chairman of the BCOA and President of the Peabody Coal
Company. FinancingForOrphansRetirees Most Divisive Issue, Coal Report Says, Daily Labor Report
(BNA) No. 217, at A-14 (Nov. 8, 1990). The "alternative" plan was proposed by Commissioners
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/5
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The "industry-wide proposal" envisions a restructuring of the
existing UMWA Plans into two new plans which would be funded
without regard to whether the contributors are party to a labor contract with the UMWA. The first new plan would provide benefits
to all existing UMWA retirees whose last employer (including all
companies with common ownership) is out of business.," It would
be financed by a tax on all coal industry employers. 62 The second
new plan would provide health care to any 1950 or 1974 Plan beneficiary whose employer or any company affiliated with the beneficiary's last employer remains in business, irrespective of whether
such company currently contributes to the UMWA Plans. A current
or former signatory (including affiliates) last employing any beneficiary in this plan would be required to pay a fair share of the
plan's costs.63 Thus, under the industry-wide proposal, roughly half
of the current 124,191 beneficiaries would become an industry responsibility, the remainder would be placed in a plan to be funded
only by companies with some connection to the beneficiaries, either
a direct employment relationship or a corporate affiliation to a company which had such an employment relationship.
The "alternative proposal" does not envision the creation of new
plans or the imposition of an industry-wide tax. Rather, it places
a greater emphasis on collective bargaining solutions, cost containment, an asset transfer from the overfunded 1950 Pension Plan, and
so forth. However, it too envisions a "reachback" provision which
would impose a statutory requirement to resume contributions on
past UMWA signatories who have no present contractual obligation
to the UMWA Plans to resume contributions. 64

V.

THE CONSTIuTiONAL DIMENSION

A.

Introduction
There are two basic solutions to the UMWA retiree health care
dilemma: a private-party solution which relies heavily on collective
61. This new plan would also provide coverage to future retirees who lose health benefits because
their last employer goes out of business, irrespective of whether their employer was a UMWA signatory.
62. REPORT, supra note 16, at 85.

63. by
Id.The
at 86.
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bargaining and a governmentally imposed solution. A hybrid of the
two is also possible. A government solution, in the form of legislative enactments such as those discussed by the Dole Commission,
might lead to constitutional challenges. As one commentator has
noted, "[w]henever new regulations make the conduct of an economic activity more difficult, there are those who assert that the
regulations violate one or more of their constitutionally protected
rights.' '65 This is not to suggest, of course, that such challenges are
without merit simply by virtue of their regularity. Despite the difficulty of mounting a constitutional attack on economic regulation,6
the Supreme Court will not hesitate to entertain such challenges,
and sustain them when constitutional infirmities can be demonstrated. 67 In the instant case, challenges might be brought under
several theories.
B.

The Source of CongressionalAuthority to Legislate

The primary source for Congressional authority to regulate private economic conduct in order to protect the health, safety, morals
or general well' being of the populace is the Commerce Clause. 68 The
Clause has been interpreted as a grant of plenary authority to Congress, 69 "complete in itself, [which] may be exercised to its utmost
extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed
in the constitution." 70 Moreover, the Supreme Court has consistently

65. Fox, Federal ConstitutionalLimitations on the Regulation of Coal Mining Activities, 3 J.
Mmr. L. & POL'Y 3 (1987).
66. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (citations omitted):
It is by now well established that legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of

economic life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality, and that the burden
is on one complaining of a due process violation to establish that the legislature has acted
in an arbitrary and irrational way.

67. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (invalidating a
California Coastal Comm'n land use regulation as an impermissible taking of property without compensation); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (holding that state
law requiring landowner to permit installation of cable television facilities on rental property was
invalid as uncompensated taking); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (invalidating
imposition of federal navigable servitude on private property as an uncompensated taking).

68. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
69. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 840 (1976); Cleveland v. United States,
329 U.S. 14, 19 (1946); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
70. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/5
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upheld legislative enactments under the Commerce Clause designed

to regulate conduct not strictly commercial in nature.2
The Commerce Clause has provided the authority for Congres7
sional regulation in areas as diverse as lotteries 72 and civil rights. 1
So long as the regulated activity affects interstate commerce in the
view of Congress, the Court must defer if there is any rational basis
for that finding. 74 Given the Court's extremely broad reading of the
Commerce Clause, it has rarely been a source of serious constitu75
tional challenge to Congressional action.
C. Limitations on CongressionalAuthority: Overview of the
Fifth Amendment
The broad grant of authority to Congress under the Commerce
Clause is not without limitation. The due process and just compensation clauses of the Fifth Amendment 76 provide a check on Congress' authority by protecting private citizens from unreasonable
government action. 77 Under the due process clause, the government
71. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941):
Congress, following its own conception of public policy concerning the restrictions which
may appropriately be imposed on interstate commerce, is free to exclude from ... [such]
commerce articles whose use in the states for which are destined it may conceive to be
injurious to the public health, morals, or welfare, even though the state has not sought to
regulate their use.
72. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
73. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294 (1964).
74. In many respects, the authority of Congress to regulate non-commercial activity under the
Commerce Clause is similar to the authority traditionally exercised by the states under their inherent
police power. Both enjoy similar presumptions of validity, and are often discussed interchangeably
when considering the appropriate standards to be applied in testing the constitutionality of regulations.
See, e.g., Fox, supra note 65, at 5; see also Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934) (discussing
the "federal police power").
75. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981);
Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258; Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 303-04.
76. "No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CoNsT. amend.
V.
77. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the actions of
state governments. However, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause imposes on the federal government an obligation to treat all citizens equally as an aspect of the Fifth Amendment's fundamental
fairness requirement. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
[T]he Fifth Amendment 'prevents the public from loading upon one individual more than
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must act reasonably. That is, legislation must have an identifiable
public purpose and must be reasonably related to accomplishing that
purpose by not being arbitrary, capricious, or unduly burdensome.
Under the just compensation clause, the government miust compensate property owners whenever the government acquires private
property for its own use.
The due process and just compensation clauses overlap. As Justice
Holmes observed in the now famous case, Pennsylvania Coal Co.

v. Mahon,78 "[t]he general rule at least is, that while property may
be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking. '79 Justice Holmes' observation set the stage
for what has since become the jurisprudence of regulatory takings,80
a hybrid between purely permissible regulation which simply "adjust[s] the burdens and benefits of economic life,' 81 and compensable takings which entirely deprive an owner of property.
Since the Court's decision in Mahon, the regulatory takings analysis has been applied to an increasingly wide variety of cases.8 2 The
problem, however, is that because regulatory takings cases inevitably
involve a balancing of interests in determining who should bear the
burden of financial loss, the property owner or the public,83 no clear
tests have been developed by the Court to determine when regulation
becomes an impermissible taking. Indeed, as one commentator has
his just share of the burdens of government, and says that when he surrenders to the public
something more and different from that which is exacted from other members of the public,
a full and just equivalent shall be returned to him.'
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 n.7 (1980) (quoting Monongahela Navigation
Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 323 (1893)).
78. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
79. Id. at 415.
80. See, e.g., Williamson Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 197-98 (1985).
81. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
82. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (upholding
state mining subsidence regulation); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986)
(upholding Multi-employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, imposing liability on employers
withdrawing from multi-employer pension plans); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984)
(upholding Environmental Protection Agency health and safety disclosure regulations); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (upholding provisions of Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104 (1978) (upholding zoning regulations restricting commercial development of space above private
property).
83. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/5
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observed, "[iln truth, the collected decisions of the Supreme Court,
and all other courts, leave the subject as disheveled as a ragpicker's
coat." The Supreme Court itself has observed that "[tihe attempt
to determine when regulation, goes so far that it becomes, literally
or figuratively, a 'taking' has been called the 'lawyer's equivalent
of the physicist's hunt for the quark.' ' 85 Another commentator has
identified no fewer than four separate tests employed by the Court
86
in recent cases to determine when a regulatory taking has occurred.
At best, the Court describes its approach as "ad hoc, factual in87
quiries."
A further complicating factor is the remedial aspect of the takings clause and the fundamental fairness line of analysis. Takings
clause cases traditionally involve, as a remedy, just compensation
to the injured party. 88 On the other hand, fundamental fairness cases
usually require invalidation of the challenged statute, and if appropriate, actual damages.8 9 Nevertheless, the Court has applied the
takings clause analysis to regulatory cases challenging the imposition
of a tax or scheme of compensation, where a just compensation
remedy would be meaningless. 9°
It is against this analytic framework that the governmental solution model to the problem of paying for retiree health care in the
coal industry must be examined.
D.

Due Process and Fundamental Fairness

1. Is There An Identifiable Public Purpose?
The first prong of the due process fairness test, the existence of
an identifiable public interest, is normally a question left entirely to
84. Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. Ray. 1057, 1059
n.11 (1980).
85. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. at 199 n.17 (1985) (quoting C. HAA, LAND-UsE PLA ac1o 766

(1976)).
86. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part I-A Critique of
Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAx.n. L. Ray. 1301, 1316 (1989).
87. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979), cited with approval in Connolly,
475 U.S. at 224; Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005.
88. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).
89. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. at 197 & n.15.
90. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 224-28; Republic Industries, Inc. v. Teamsters Joint Council, 718
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the legislature. Accordingly, minimal scrutiny is applied. Judicial
deference will be shown unless the legislature's determination of
public purpose involves an impossibility, 91 or is "palpably without
92
reasonable foundation."
The existence of such a strict burden does not automatically lead
to the conclusion, however, that a public purpose always exists when
the legislature acts. In Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,93 for example,
the Supreme Court held that the Kohler Act, a Pennsylvania statute
designed to remedy the harmful effects of surface subsidence in the
coal mining industry, was unconstitutional because the statute did
not "disclose a public interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a
destruction of ... constitutionally protected rights ' 94 of the coal
companies whose interests were adversely affected. Although Pennsylvania Coal has since come to stand for the proposition that regulation can become a taking, 95 and thereby invoke a just
compensation analysis under the due process clause, the case is fundamentally one evaluating the public purpose espoused by the state
legislature upon passage of the Kohler Act.
The Kohler Act prohibited the removal by underground mining
of coal located beneath homes and other surface structures, in order
to avoid the surface subsidence which sometimes resulted. Justice
Holmes' opinion set forth the public interest question which is an
integral component of the due process analysis:
This is the case of a single private house. No doubt there is a public interest even
in this, as there is in every purchase and sale and in all that happens within the
commonwealth. Some existing rights may be modified even in such a case. But
usually in ordinary private affairs the public interest does not warrant much of
this kind of interference. A source of damage to such a house is not a public
nuisance even if similar damage is inflicted on others in different places. The
damage is not common or public. The extent of the public interest [in preventing
subsidence] is shown by the statute to be limited, since the statute ordinarily does
not apply to land when the surface is owned by the owner of the coal. Furthermore, it is not justified as a protection of personal safety. That could be

91. See e.g., Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925).
92. United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896).
93. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
94. Id.at 414.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/5
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provided for by notice. Indeed the very foundation of this bill is that the defendant
gave timely notice of its intent to mine under the house ....
If we were called
upon to deal with the plaintiff's position alone, we should think it clear that the
statute does not disclose a public interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a
destruction of the defendant's constitutionally protected rights [to realize its prop-

erty interest in the coal]."

The Supreme Court revisited almost the identical issue as that
decided in Pennsylvania Coal sixty-five years later in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis. 7 Keystone involved a challenge to the Pennsylvania Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land
Conservation Act, designed to minimize subsidence caused by underground mining of coal and to regulate its consequences. Because
of the apparent facial similarities between the Subsidence Act and
the Kohler Act, the coal industry challenged the new law on the
basis of the Court's earlier decision in PennsylvaniaCoal. The Court
declined to overrule the Subsidence Act however, noting that while
the Kohler Act "merely involve[d] a balancing of the private economic interests of coal companies against the private economic interests of surface owners,"9 the Subsidence Act set forth identifiable
public purposes which were "genuine, substantial, and legitimate." 99
"None of the indicia of a statute enacted solely for the benefit of
private parties identified in Justice Holmes' opinion are present
here." 1°° The Court specifically took note of Section 2 of the Subsidence Act, which set forth that the Act sought to protect the
"health, safety and general welfare" of the citizenry by enhancing
the value of surface land for taxation, preserving the land and adjacent water supplies, and improving the general use and enjoyment
of the surface lands. 101
What is significant about the Court's Keystone decision is that
it distinguishes Pennsylvania Coal on the existence of an identifiable
public purpose, rather than simply overruling it. Hence the Court
appears to be confirming that some investigation into this due proc96. Id. at 413-14 (citations omitted).
97. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenidictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
98. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485.
99. Id. at 486.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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ess requirement is in order and that the question whether an identifiable public interest exists in legislation is not merely a matter of
judicial lip-service.' l 2

As a threshold matter, then, the Dole Commission's legislative
solutions to the problem of paying for UMWA retiree health care
embody a fundamental question of whether a true public purpose
behind the recommendations exists, or whether, as the Keystone majority suggests, paraphrasing Pennsylvania Coal, the proposed legislation "merely involve[s] a balancing of private economic interests
of coal companies." It is not self-evident that there is a sufficient
public interest to support a legislative action which, in effect, would
transfer private-party contract obligations to entities not party to
the contract. Doubtless there exists a public interest in providing
adequate health care to the elderly sufficient to satisfy due process.
Indeed, Medicare already provides a minimum level of benefits to
all retirees age 65 or older. It might be difficult, however, to ar-ticulate a sufficient public interest to justify federal intervention
guaranteeing supplemental health benefits to UMWA retirees when
sixty percent of all private sector workers are not employed by companies which provide post-retirement health care' 0 3 and when 37 million Americans have no health insurance whatsoever. 10 Perhaps it
could be argued that, because of the health hazards of their occupation, there exists a special public interest in the health of coal
miners. Accepting this as true, it cannot be said that legislation such
as that envisioned by the Dole Commission would be reflective of
102. The significance of the dissenting opinion in Keystone must not be discounted, however.
With the concurrence of Justices PoweU, O'Connor, and Scalia, Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out

that the majority's public purpose analysis constituted an insufficient basis upon which to distinguish
the cases, finding instead that the Kohler Act invalidated in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon had much
of the same public purpose aims as the Subsidence Act. According to the dissent, "[t]here can be
no doubt that the Kohler Act was intended to serve public interests ... The public purposes in this
case are not sufficient to distinguish it from Pennsylvania Coal." Keystone, 480 U.S. at 511 (footnote
omitted). To the extent that the Keystone dissenters may now constitute a new Court majority, it
remains to be seen whether the public purpose test will maintain its viability. In any event, the existence

of a legitimate public purpose does not end all further inquiry. In Keystone the Court went on to
analyze the impact of the regulation to determine if the due process requirements were otherwise
satisfied. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 493-99. Accord Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d
1169, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
103. See supra note 11.
104. See Kahn, supra note 17, at 126.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/5
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a general public interest in providing supplemental health benefits
to elderly mine workers and their families, because, unlike such remedial legislation as the Mine Safety Act and the Black Lung Benefits Program, this legislation would benefit only a sub-group which
had been receiving such benefits pursuant to a contractual agreement
between private parties - not all retired mineworkers. 0 5
The clearest explanation of why a governmental solution to
UMWA retiree health care is warranted, that is, why there exists
identifiable public purpose sufficient to justify legislative intervention to adjust private economic interests among coal companies,
seems to be the emphasis on federal involvement in the area of
mineworker health benefits-historically, as set forth-in a UMWABCOA joint presentation to the Commission. 106 This involvement
took the form of federal participation in the creation of the Plans'
predecessor in 1946,107 a federally sponsored survey in 1946 of health
care and housing conditions in coal mining areas, 108 the provision
of federal funds by the U.S. Department of Commerce to the Presbyterian Church in 1963 which enabled the Church to purchase hospitals owned by the 1950 Fund, 109 passage of the Black Lung
Amendments to the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969,110 appointment of the Presidential Coal Commission by Pres-

ident Carter in 1978 and subsequent passage of the Multi-employer
Pension Plan Act of 1980 (MPPAA),y' and numerous court deci-

105. In this regard, Justice Holmes' observation in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon that, on its
face, the Kohler Act seemed to lack a public interest because it did not seek to prevent subsidence
where the mineral and surface owner were the same is particularly apropos. Since the coal tax would
benefit only coal industry retirees in the UMWA Plans, and not all coal industry retirees, it seems
facially evident that the intent of such legislation would be to underwrite a commitment contained
in a private contract, not to assure a certain level of health care to all coal industry retirees. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413-14.
106. REPoRT, supra note 16, at 19-42. "The challenge to find ways to cope with the present
crisis in the medical care delivery system started by a collective bargaining agreement negotiated
between the UMWA and the coal operators, with help from the Federal government, four and onehalf decades ago." Id. at 40.
107. Id. at 24.

108. Id. at 25-26.
109. Id. at 31.
110. Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. § 901-956 (1972).
111. Multi-employer Pension Plan Amendments Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1381- 1453 (1988) (Employee

Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (1988)).
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sions which have had significant impact on the operation of the
2
UMWA Plans."
These events do not necessarily compel a conclusion that there
has been sufficient federal involvement in mineworker health benefits to require a governmentally imposed solution. The federal government has clearly never promised to provide health care to UMWA
retirees, nor has it coerced anyone else into doing so. Although such
benefits may have been provided by the UMWA 1950 Fund prior
to 1974, it would not appear that UMWA retirees had any basis to
claim a legal entitlement to such benefits prior to the 1974 Agreement. Moreover, Commission members themselves were not in
agreement on this point." 3 In the view of one Commissioner, Richard M. Holsten:
[t]he basic cause of the Funds' problems today has really nothing to do with the
federal government as some would profess ....

It is the cumulative result of the

collective bargaining process over the years, as far back as 1950, in which the
BCOA has progressively made health care commitments to the UMWA, commitments that may have been entirely rational at the time but have now become
economically unbearable.

114

In contrast, Commission Vice-Chairman Henry H. Perritt emphasized the role of federal judicial involvement in undermining the
key features of the present private arrangements." 5 "The judicial
decisions taken together say that the health benefits must be paid,
while depriving the private sector of the means to pay for them
....
[T]he equitable realities are that the law has frustrated realization of a private arrangement to provide a safety net for people
' 6 He went
who have a vested right to retiree health care benefits. ""
on to observe that "[a] variety of other governmental policies reflected in labor law and interpretation of labor law have made it
difficult for the United Mine Workers of America to maintain a

112. REPORT, supra note 16, at 32-33.
113. "Some Commission members do not believe that the government is responsible for the

Funds' present financial crisis or that it is necessary for the government to be involved in resolving
the present crisis." Id. at 19 n.1.
114. Id. at 120-21.
115. Id. at 107.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/5
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sufficient organization base and contractual uniformity to secure an
adequate financing base ....

When the present system falls apart

there will be instability, not only in the
organized part of the industry
11 7
but in the coal industry generally.
It is entirely possible that concerns such as those voiced by Commissioner Perritt would, in the view of the Court, satisfy the public
interest prong of the due process test. Yet the question still remains
whether such concerns, as real and significant as they may be, provide an identifiable public interest sufficiently related to the health,
safety, morality, and general welfare of the populace to warrant
legislative balancing of interests. More attention will undoubtedly
need to be paid to this threshold aspect of due process analysis of
the Commission's legislative options.
2. Are the Commission's Recommendations Reasonably
Related to the Perceived Problem: The Ends-Means Analysis
The relationship between the perceived public purpose behind
legislative solutions and the means employed to accomplish the purpose is perhaps the more significant due process inquiry. Fundamentally, the means chosen by Congress to accomplish a legislative
end must not be arbitrary or irrational.118 Aspects of the Commission's proffered solutions are especially vulnerable to an arbitrariness
inquiry because of their apparent retroactive effect. Also, some of
the funding proposals would make employers who never participated
in the UMWA Plans liable for benefits they never promised. This
might raise issues under the ends-means analysis because such a solution could affect the competitive structure in the industry by requiring some employers to pay for a contractual promise made by
their competitors.
For example, the Commission recommends imposing by statute
contribution obligations on past signatories, consistent with an ERISA "control group" test, possibly reaching as far back as 1978
117. Id.

118. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729 (1984);
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
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(the "reachback" proposal). 19 The effect of such a statute would
be to retroactively impose funding obligations on past signatories
who may have lawfully withdrawn from the UMWA Plans, fulfilling
their contribution obligations consistent with the clear terms of their
collective bargaining agreements.
Retroactive legislation of this type is normally subject to special
scrutiny because "it does not follow that what Congress can legislate
prospectively it can legislate retroactively. The retroactive aspects of
legislation, as well as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of
due process, and the justifications for the latter may not suffice for
the former."' ' 12 Is it fundamentally fair, therefore, to impose retroactively such a burden on former signatories, or may those operators successfully argue that their conduct was in justifiable reliance
on the current state of their contractual obligations and the law,
and that unsettling those reliance interests is arbitrary or irrational?
While it is settled that Congress has the authority to legislate
retroactively in order to adjust the burdens and benefits of economic
life, 21 the Court will examine retroactivity with particular attention
to such factors as (a) whether reliance interests are unfairly disrupted;'2 (b) if there is a rational basis for applying a statute retroactively; 23 and (c) whether the parties had sufficient notice or
could reasonably have anticipated possible changes in the law in
order to adjust their conduct in anticipation.'2
a.

The Reliance Interest

The Commission's recommendation to impose a contribution obligation as far back as 1978 would have the effect of invalidating
a course of conduct going back twelve years or longer for certain
operators. Entirely new obligations would be created for those com119. REPORT, supra note 16, at 81.
120. Usery, 428 U.S. at 16-17.
121. Id. at 16.
122. Connolly v Pension Benefits Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227 (1986).
123. Nachman Corp v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 592 F.2d 947, 960 (7th Cir. 1979)
(citations omitted), aff'd on stat. grounds, 446 U.S. 359 (1980).
124. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Gray, 467 U.S. 717, 730-32 (1984).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/5
28

Woodrum and Rothman: Proposals for Funding United Mine Workers of America Retiree Heal

1991]

FUNDING UMWA HEALTH BENEFITS

panies. They would undoubtedly argue the importance of their reliance on both contractual and legal authority for their withdrawal,
as well as the costs and benefits of their decided course of conduct.
However, in addressing this aspect of the reliance equation, the Court
must also consider the reliance interests of the retirees.125 The inquiry
may well turn on whether retroactivity is a critical requirement for
guaranteeing retiree benefits. If other means are available, retroactivity may create too great an interference with employer expectations dating back as much as twelve years. In this regard, the
question of whether current signatories can afford to maintain the
existing funding mechanism, or whether it would be financially prohibitive for them to do so, may be material.
One factor the Court may weigh in evaluating competing reliance
interests is the question of notice. In Republic Industries, Inc. v.
Teamsters Joint Council,126 an employer who had withdrawn from
a multi-employer pension plan prior to the effective date of the
Multi-employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA)127
challenged the retroactive imposition of pension plan withdrawal
liability. The court of appeals observed that the employer had fair
notice of its potential multi-employer pension plan withdrawal liability because of extended Congressional deliberations over the
MPPAA legislation. The court concluded that these pre-enactment
events diminished the company's reliance interest in its asserted right
to withdraw from a multi-employer plan in favor of employee expectations. 128
Another factor may be the source of competing reliance interests.
In Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., the circuit
court took note of the vested nature of employee pension rights,
the existing ERISA statutory scheme establishing vesting schedules,
125. See, e.g., Nachman, 592 F.2d at 961-62.
126. 718 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984).
127. MPPAA amended ERISA, and provided that an employer who ceased to contribute to an

underfunded multi-employer pension plan must pay withdrawal liability. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1453
(1988). The problem which Congress sought to be addressed with MPPAA, stabilizing underfunded

multi-employer pension plans, has important parallels to the instant situation, stabilizing underfunded
multi-employer benefit plans. Thus, the case law analyzing the constitutional boundaries of MPPAA

may be of particular relevance.
128. Republic, 718 F.2d at 638.
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and prior federal regulation in the area of pension plan terminations,
to conclude that a stronger case existed for favoring employee re1 29
liance interests over the employer's.
Bearing these factors in mind when evaluating the possible legislative solutions for funding UMWA retiree benefits, attention necessarily must be paid to such things as the absence of any concept
of "vesting" in the health benefits area, the absence of a federal
statutory scheme concerning postretirement health benefits, or other
factors which could arguably create an employee reliance interest
originating in anything other than a contractual promise.
b.

The Rational Basis for Retroactive Application

The rationality aspect of retroactivity amounts to a determination
of the reasonableness of spreading risks by reaching back to prior
conduct. In Nachman, the issue was retroactive imposition of liability under ERISA for payment of unfunded, vested benefits upon
individual employers who terminated single employer pension plans.
Retroactivity was held constitutional because it was thought reasonable to hold an employer, who had received the full benefit of
services from his employees, liable for his promise to fund their
3
pensions. 30 Similarly, in Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Gray,1 1
retroactive withdrawal liability provisions under the MPPAA
amendments to ERISA were upheld under a due process challenge.
The Court noted Congress' concern that multi-employer pension plans
encouraged employer withdrawal as a means of avoiding contribution obligations. 32 Thus, Congress provided that MPPAA withdrawal liability would be applied retroactively, but only with respect
to the period of Congressional consideration and debate of the proposed amendments. In that situation, the retroactivity was applied
for the "short and limited period[] required by the practicalities of

129. Nachman, 592 F.2d at 961-62. The Court's statutory afflrmance of the Nachman decision

has been considered by many courts as a sub silentio affirmance of the constitutional issues in the
case as well. See Republic, 718 F.2d at 636 n.9.
130. Nachman, 592 F.2d at 963.
131. 467 U.S. 717 (1984).
132. Id. at 731 (citing 126 CoNo. Rac. 20179 (1980) (statement of Sen. Javits); 126 CoNe. Rnc.
20244 (1980) at 20244 (remarks of Sen. Matsunaga)).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/5
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producing national legislation ..
a customary congressional practice."'3 Finally, in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.,IM the Court
approved the retroactive application of liability for the effects of
past disabilities under the Black Lung Act as a "rational measure
to spread the costs of the employees' disabilities to those who have
profited from the fruits of their labor-the operators and the coal

consumers. "135
Applying these three different rationality criteria - responsibility
for unfulfilled past promises; maintaining the benefits of the statutory scheme during its pendency; and payment for the natural costs
of doing business - to the Commission's proposals still leaves considerable questions about the reasonableness of the Commission's
retroactive contribution recommendation. Coal industry employers
who have never been party to a contract with the UMWA would
appear to have a particularly strong argument that they have never
had notice that they might be required to pay for the health benefits
of UMWA pensioners. Moreover, such employers can also point out
that they have made costly benefit commitments to their own employees and retirees in reliance on the long established coal industry
practice that only signatories to UMWA contracts were obligated to
pay for UMWA retiree health benefits.
Unlike the concern voiced by the Court in Nachman, it remains
to be seen whether the promise of retiree health care may yet be
fulfilled without reaching back to employers who withdrew from the
UMWA Plans as long as twelve years ago. In Nachman, which involved a single employer pension plan, no mechanism existed to
provide promised benefits where the employer failed or refused to
do so. Of course, the UMWA Benefit Plans exist for the very purpose of providing benefits in this situation. Moreover, the 1988
Agreement contains provisions which deter current contributors from
withdrawing, by requiring payment of withdrawal liability if they
do.136 Thus, it is far from clear that retirees will lose their promised
133. Gray, 467 U.S. at 731 (quoting United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 296-97 (1981)
(per curiam)).
134. 428 U.S. at 18.
135. Id.
136. See by
1988
Agreement,
XX(i),@XX(j).
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health benefits unless a "reach back" is imposed, a question which
may distinguish the issue addressed by the Commission from that
facing the Court in Nachman. It may be the case that a prospective
remedy will suffice. And if a prospective remedy, in conjunction
with other less controversial aspects of the Commission's recommendations, will solve the problem, there may be little reason to
legislate retroactively at all, even for the sake of protecting the integrity of the legislative process, as was the case in Gray.
Finally, concerning the question of unjust enrichment, that is,
retiree health care obligations which former employers are seen as
avoiding but which are thought to be rightly theirs, Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.'37
is especially informative. In Connolly, the Court upheld the 1980
MPPAA amendments to ERISA against a due process takings challenge. 138 Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Powell, wrote specifically to explain that the Court declined to decide, either in Connolly
or Gray, whether the withdrawal liability provisions of MPPAA may
in some circumstances be so arbitrary and irrational as to violate
the Due Process clause. "Our recent cases leave open the possibility
that the imposition of retroactive liability on employers for the benefit of employees may be arbitrary and irrational in the absence of
any connection between the employer's conduct and some detriment
to the employee.' ' 39 According to Justice O'Connor, retroactive liability, to be constitutional, "must rest on some basis in the employer's conduct that would make it rational to treat the employees'
expectations of benefits under the plan as the employer's responsibility.' 4
Because MPPAA withdrawal liability is intended to ensure that
a withdrawing employer will contribute a fair share of unfunded
liabilities, there is a presumption that employers are liable for those
shortfalls in the first place. To cite one example raised in the con-

137. 475 U.S. 211, 228 (1986).
138. MPPAA's retroactivity aspects were previously upheld in Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.
v. Gray, 467 U.S. 717 (1984).
139. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 229 (citations omitted).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/5
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currence, there may well be a degree of arbitrariness involved in
imposing retroactive contribution obligations on employers who may
have long since severed their obligations as signatories, having had
no say whatever in benefit levels, contribution rates, or other conditions which may have led to the present deficits. 141 Indeed, it could
be argued that the remaining signatories' obligation to fund the negotiated benefits is precisely what the parties bargained for. In Justice
O'Connor's view at least, it may be irrational to impose retroactive
contribution obligations on parties who may have no demonstrable
connection to the UMWA Plans. Justice O'Connor concludes by
suggesting that such "as applied" challenges to retroactive legislation
are still viable under MPPAA, and by analogy, such challenges may
exist should Congress enact legislation similar to the Commission's
proposals.
c. The Notice Requirement
Finally, on the question of adequate notice of retroactive enactments, the Court has traditionally interpreted this requirement
broadly, noting that any pre-enactment events which give a party
fair notice of proposed regulation will suffice. 142 In Connolly, for
example, the Court noted that Congressional concern with pension
plans long before the passage of ERISA in 1974 and its continuing
concern with pension regulation provided ample notice to employers
that they were involved in a highly regulated field. As the Court
noted in Connolly, "those who do business in the regulated field
cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent
amendments to achieve the legislative end."' 143
But is this really the case with respect to health benefits? No
corollary statutory scheme exists to regulate health care as with pensions. On the contrary, a long-standing private arrangement, collective bargaining, has been the exclusive means by which health
benefits have been determined in the coal and other industries. It
141. Id.
142. United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 299 (1981) (per curiam); United States v. Hudson, 299 U.S. 498, 501 (1937).
143. Connolly,
U.S. at 227
(quoting FHA
v. The
Darlington,
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may not be reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the employers
who withdrew from the Funds during the past twelve years were
doing business in the "regulated field" as that term was used by
the Court in its Connolly decision. In light of the total absence of
regulation, it may not suffice to simply point to the existence of
the Commission as an example of adequate notice, especially in light
of as much as twelve years of reliance interests by employers who
may be subject to a reach back provision. It is, of course, possible
that the Court could find adequate notice in the language that has
been in the wage agreements since 1974 which provides that retirees
and surviving spouses are entitled to a health card for life. Whether
contractual language might suffice as adequate notice of possible
legislative initiatives is certainly open to question.
E. Due Process and Compensatory Takings
The other limitation on legislative authority contained in the Fifth
Amendment is the just compensation clause. Traditionally, the just
compensation clause is invoked whenever the government, by operation of eminent domain, takes private property for public use.
In such circumstances, the Fifth Amendment requires that compensation be paid, in order to "bar government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burden which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.'" 144 Increasingly, however,
the takings clause has been applied to a wide variety of cases involving not condemnation of property for public use, but economic
regulation which operates to deny an owner of property some or
all of its economic use.
As already noted, 145 the Court's takings analysis has provided
considerable confusion. Nevertheless, certain consistent criteria
emerge. Using the Court's decision in Connolly as a model because
of the similarity between the statutory scheme challenged in that
case and the industry-wide tax proposal, the Court will most likely
rely on three factors of "particular significance": "(1) 'the economic
144. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/5
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impact of the regulation on the claimant'; (2) 'the extent to which
the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations'; and (3) 'the character of the governmental action." ' 146 All
three criteria, in some form or another, have been cited by the Court
in most of its recent regulatory takings cases.1 47
1.

The Economic Impact of the Proposed Legislation

The first of these criteria, the economic impact of the regulation,
tends to vary considerably in importance depending upon the Court's
view of the facts. At times the Court has looked at the degree of
diminution of the claimant's property as a result of the challenged
regulation. Such appeared to be the case in the Court's original
regulatory takings case, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. There the
Court stated that, "[o]ne fact for consideration in determining [limits on regulation] is the extent of the diminution [in value]. When
it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not all cases there must
be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the
act.' 1 48 In Pennsylvania Coal, the Court found that the challenged
subsidence regulation so significantly diminished the value of the
coal companies' estate in land that it constituted a taking, especially
in view of the absence of an identifiable public interest behind the
statute under review.
Another way the Court considers the economic impact of a regulation is whether the challenged law still permits an economically
viable use of the owner's property, despite the impact of the regulation on the owner's preferred use.1 49 Under this formulation, a
challenge to the regulation will be rejected unless the claimant can
show there is no economically viable use left in its property. The

146. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225 (quoting Penn Central v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, at 124).
147. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984); Pruneyard Shopping Center
v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-83 (1980); Williamson Co. v. Reg. Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank
of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 191 (1985); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
148. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
149. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131, 138 n.36; Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980);

Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264 (1981).
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economically viable use sufficient to satisfy the Court, however, may
be a far cry from the claimant's conception. 50
In Connolly, the Court approached the issue of economic impact
from an entirely different perspective. While acknowledging that the
impact of MPPAA was to completely deprive an employer of whatever money it must pay to satisfy its statutory obligation, and thus
constituted a complete "taking" of those assets, the Court noted
that the withdrawal assessments were not made in a "vacuum," but
"directly depend[ed] on the relationship between the employer and
the plan to which it had made contributions."'' Moreover, the Court
noted certain provisions of MPPAA which moderated the economic
impact of the assessments on any particular employer. "There is
nothing to show that the withdrawal liability actually imposed on
an employer will always be out of proportion to its experience with
,152
"...
the plan .
Applying these tests to the Commission's recommended industrywide tax helps to focus the problem. Certainly as in Connolly, a
coal tonnage tax would completely deprive an operator of whatever
monies it was thereby obligated to pay, constituting a "taking." But
unlike the situation in Connolly, there would appear to be a real
question concerning whether the tax existed in a "vacuum." It is
conceivable that for numerous employers, there may be no direct
connection between the assessment and the Benefit Plan being
funded. 53 For many companies it may be impossible to show a direct
relationship between the tax assessed and a retiree health care obligation. Thus, numerous "as applied" challenges could conceivably
exist.
150. For example, in Andrus, .44 U.S. 51, claimants were forbidden by statute to sell artifacts
containing eagle feathers. Nevertheless, the Court found that claimants retained the right to exclude
others from seeing the artifacts, something the Court deemed a valuable property right, leading to
the conclusion that claimants could charge for viewings, thereby retaining a viable economic use of

the artifacts. Id. at 58.
151. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225.
152. Id. at 226.
153. Employers currently contributing to the UMWA Plans point out that they have no con-

nection to the roughly 50% of the Plan beneficiaries who are "orphans" either, which is the reason
this group should be considered an industry obligation. Of course, the current signatories who are
party to the labor contract which promises such benefits presumably factor the cost of providing this

benefit into the total economics reflected in the labor agreement.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/5
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Finally, attention would certainly have to be paid to whatever
moderating or mitigating provisions might be included in any legislation adopting portions of the Commission's proposals, as such
factors seem to have played a significant role in the Court's decision
54
in Connolly.1
2.

Interference with Investment-Backed Expectations

The second takings criterion, interference with direct investmentbacked expectations, has also been the subject of varying treatment
by the Court. In most cases, the inquiry seems to turn on whether
the challenged regulation was foreseeable, almost in the same way
that foreseeability is a factor in the Court's retroactivity analysis set
out above.' 155
In the takings context, however, foreseeability is clearest when
the government action is actually known to the challenging party.
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,156 for example, the Court denied
the company's takings challenge to the government's disclosure of
health and safety data since the challenged regulations specifically
permitted the disclosure at issue. Hence the company had no basis
to complain of interference with reasonable expectations.
In Connolly, the Court analyzed the foreseeability factor in terms
of historic regulation of pension benefits. The Court noted that given
the history of pension regulation and Congressional concern with
the matter, "[p]rudent employers had more than sufficient notice
not only that pension plans were currently regulated, but also that
157
withdrawal itself might trigger additional financial obligations."'
In this respect, of course, an industry-wide tax presents a significant
difficulty, much akin to the retroactivity issue previously noted. As
no history of government regulation exists in the area of retiree
health benefits, in contrast with the pension field, can it reasonably
be said that an industry-wide tax to finance retiree health care for
a discrete portion of the coal industry was ever foreseeable? If not,

154.
155.
156.
157.

Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225-226.
See supra notes 142 and 143 and accompanying text.
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
Connolly, 475 U.S. at 227.
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reasonable investment-backed expectations would appear to be
stronger. This is especially so for those in the industry who have
addressed their own retiree health care responsibilities by private
arrangements, whether unilaterally or through collective bargaining.
3.

The Nature of the Government Action

Finally, the nature of the government action being contemplated
deserves some attention. Traditionally, this inquiry centers on the
question of whether a physical invasion or other form of "condemnation" has occurred, in order to determine whether an eminent
domain situation exists.' 8 Beyond that initial inquiry, the question
then focuses on whether the government action is for the purpose
of accomplishing a legitimate end or whether there is justification
1 59
for the action.
In Connolly, the Court focused its governmental action inquiry
on whether the withdrawal liability requirements at issue in that case
constituted a taking or whether they were simply part of a "public
program that adjusts the burdens and benefits economic life to promote the common good. . .. "160 Finding in favor of the latter, the
Court concluded that no taking had occurred, but that a regulatory
scheme had been enacted which was not sufficient to rise to the level
of constitutional infirmity. Nevertheless, the Court again emphasized
the identifiable public purpose aspect of the MPPAA amendments,
an issue already shown to raise concerns when applied to the Commission's proffered solutions generally.
VI.

CoNcLusIoN

Employers are under no statutory obligation to provide postretirement health benefits, but a great many do. To date Congress
has not considered legislation which would require employers to pre-

158. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).

159. In Keystone, for example, the Court focused, among other things, on the nuisance like
quality of the surface subsidence activity regulated by the challenged state statute. The Court found
the nature of the government action permissible because it was an attempt "to arrest what it percelve[d]
to be a significant threat to the common welfare." 480 U.S. at 485.
160. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/5
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fund retiree medical benefits or any other scheme which would insure
that employees who have been promised such benefits will in fact
receive them during their retirement.
Since 1950, UMWA retirees have looked to the multi-employer
plans created in bargaining between the UMWA and the BCOA for
health care benefits. Funding for the UMWA Plans has always been
provided by current signatories without regard to whether beneficiaries had an employment connection with a currently contributing
employer. Presently, about half of the beneficiaries in the UMWA
Plans have no employment connection with a current contributor.
At this time the Plans are experiencing funding problems, and the
cost of providing benefits is projected to increase in the future.
The UMWA and the BCOA are likely to petition Congress for
legislation which would, among other things, spread among all coal
industry employers the burden of paying for the health benefits of
this particular group of UMWA retirees. Should Congress enact legislation which contains a reach back provision or which imposes an
industry-wide tax to pay for the health benefits of some UMWA
retirees, the Supreme Court may be presented an opportunity to flesh
out the constitutional parameters of possible solutions for paying
for retiree health care in this and other industries where a funding
problem exists.
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